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Concerning Things for Which Men, and
Especially Princes, Are Praised or Blamed
It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for
a prince towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have
written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous
in mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart
from the methods of other people. But, it being my intention to
write a thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it
appears to me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of a
matter than the imagination of it; for many have pictured republics
and principalities which in fact have never been known or seen,
because how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live,
that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner
effects his ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to
act entirely up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what
destroys him among so much that is evil.
Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know
how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity.
Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince,
and discussing those which are real, I say that all men when they
are spoken of, and chiefly princes for being more highly placed,
are remarkable for some of those qualities which bring them either
blame or praise; and thus it is that one is reputed liberal, another
miserly, using a Tuscan term (because an avaricious person in our
language is still he who desires to possess by robbery, whilst we
call one miserly who deprives himself too much of the use of his
own); one is reputed generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate;
one faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another
bold and brave; one affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another
chaste; one sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one
grave, another frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving, and
the like. And I know that every one will confess that it would be
most praiseworthy in a prince to exhibit all the above qualities
that are considered good; but because they can neither be entirely
possessed nor observed, for human conditions do not permit it, it
is necessary for him to be sufficiently prudent that he may know
how to avoid the reproach of those vices which would lose him his
state; and also to keep himself, if it be possible, from those which
would not lose him it; but this not being possible, he may with
less hesitation abandon himself to them. And again, he need not
make himself uneasy at incurring a reproach for those vices without
which the state can only be saved with difficulty, for if everything
is considered carefully, it will be found that something which looks
like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else,
which looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity.
(Chapter 15).
Order and Barbarity
Cesare Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his
state during the ascendancy of his father [Pope Alexander VI], and
on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he had taken every
measure and done all that ought to be done by a prudent and virtuous
man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and fortunes
of others had bestowed on him. Because, as is stated above, he who
has not first laid his foundations may be able with great ability
to lay them afterwards, but they will be laid with trouble to the
architect and danger to the building. If, therefore, all the steps
taken by the duke be considered, it will be seen that he laid solid
foundations for his future power, and I do not consider it superfluous
to discuss them, because I do not know what better precepts to give
a new prince than the example of his actions; and if his dispositions
were of no avail, that was not his fault, but the extraordinary
and extreme malignity of fortune....
When the Duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of
weak masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them,
and gave them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the
country was full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence;
and so, wishing to bring back peace and obedience to authority,
he considered it necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon
he promoted Messer Remirro de Orco, a swift and cruel man, to whom
he gave the fullest power. This man in a short time restored peace
and unity with the greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered
that it was not advisable to confer such excessive authority, for
he had no doubt but that he would become odious, so he set up a
court of judgment in the country, under a most excellent president,
wherein all cities had their advocates. And because he knew that
the past severity had caused some hatred against himself, so, to
clear himself in the minds of the people, and gain them entirely
to himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had been practiced,
it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of
the minister. Under this pretense he took Ramiro, and one morning
caused him to be executed and left on the piazza at Cesena with
the block and a bloody knife at his side. The barbarity of this
spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied and dismayed.
... (Chapter 7)
The Lion and the Fox
You must know there are two ways of contesting, the one by the
law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the
second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient,
it is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is
necessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the
beast and the man. This has been figuratively taught to princes
by ancient writers, who describe how Achilles and many other princes
of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them
up in his discipline; which means solely that, as they had for a
teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is necessary
for a prince to know how to make use of both natures, and that one
without the other is not durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled
knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion;
because the lion cannot defend himself against snares and the fox
cannot defend himself against wolves. (Chapter 18)
On Avoiding Being Disdained and Hated
(Recommended reading along with Macbeth)
...The Prince must consider, as has been in part said before, how
to avoid those things which will make him hated or contemptible;
and as often as he shall have succeeded he will have fulfilled his
part, and he need not fear any danger in other reproaches. It makes
him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, and
to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from
both of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor
their honor is touched, the majority of men live content, and he
has only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb
with ease in many ways....(Chapter 19)
For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies
of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it
is hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear
everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes
have taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and
to keep the people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the
most important objects a prince can have....
Conspiracy and Security
(Recommended along with Elizabeth)
That prince is highly esteemed who conveys [greatness, spiritedness
and gravity], and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired
against; for, provided it is well known that he is an excellent
man and revered by his people [versus the nobles], he can only be
attacked with difficulty. For this reason a prince ought to have
two fears, one from within, on account of his subjects, the other
from without, on account of external powers. From the latter he
is defended by being well armed and having good allies, and if he
is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will always
remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they should
have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should affairs
outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations and
has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will
resist every attack...
But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed
he has only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which
a prince can easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised,
and by keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary
for him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the
most efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies
is not to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires
against a prince always expects to please them by his removal; but
when the conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he
will not have the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties
that confront a conspirator are infinite. And as experience shows,
many have been the conspiracies, but few have been successful; because
he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except
from those whom he believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you
have opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him the material
with which to content himself, for by denouncing you he can look
for every advantage; so that, seeing the gain from this course to
be assured, and seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers,
he must be a very rare friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of
the prince, to keep faith with you.
And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on
the side of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy,
prospect of punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince
there is the majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection
of friends and the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these
things the popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should
be so rash as to conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator
has to fear before the execution of his plot, in this case he has
also to fear the sequel to the crime; because on account of it he
has the people for an enemy, and thus cannot hope for any escape....
(Chapter 19)
Of a Prince's Advisors
(Recommended along with Elizabeth)
The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and
they are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince.
And the first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding,
is by observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable
and faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known
how to recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when
they are otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the
prime error which he made was in choosing them....
But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there
is one test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking
more of his own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his
own profit in everything, such a man will never make a good servant,
nor will you ever be able to trust him; because he who has the state
of another in his hands ought never to think of himself, but always
of his prince, and never pay any attention to matters in which the
prince is not concerned.
On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought
to study him, honoring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses,
sharing with him the honors and cares; and at the same time let
him see that he cannot stand alone, so that many honors may not
make him desire more, many riches make him wish for more, and that
many cares may make him dread chances. When, therefore, servants,
and princes towards servants, are thus disposed, they can trust
each other, but when it is otherwise, the end will always be disastrous
for either one or the other.
Therefore a wise prince ought to [choose] the wise men in his state,
and give to them only the liberty of speaking the truth to him,
and then only of those things of which he inquires, and of none
others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and listen
to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With
these councilors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry
himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more
freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of
these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on,
and be steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either
overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions
that he falls into contempt....
A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when
he wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage
every one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however,
he ought to be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener
concerning the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that
nay one, on any consideration, has not told him the truth, he should
let his anger be felt.
And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression
of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the
good advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived,
because this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is
not wise himself will never take good advice, unless by chance he
has yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens to be
a very prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well governed,
but it would not be for long, because such a governor would in a
short time take away his state from him.
Of Cruelty and Mercy
(Recommended along with Elizabeth)
... Every prince ought to desire to be considered merciful and not
cruel. Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this mercy.
Cesare Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty
reconciled the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and
loyalty. And if this be rightly considered, he will be seen to have
been much more merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid
a reputation for cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed. Therefore
a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought
not to mind the reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples
he will be more merciful than those who, through too much mercy,
allow disorders to arise, from which follow murders or robberies;
for these are wont to injure the whole people, whilst those executions
which originate with a prince offend the individual only.
And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid
the imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers.
Hence Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity
of her reign owing to its being new, saying, "The harshness
of things and the newness of the kingdom compel me to contrive such
things and to guard my borders from all sides."
Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should
he himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence
and humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious
and too much distrust render him intolerable....
Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that
having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men,
to fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them
or against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune.
This arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with
his boundless valor, made him revered and terrible in the sight
of his soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were
not sufficient to produce this effect. And shortsighted writers
admire his deeds from one point of view and from another condemn
the principal cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would
not have been sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio,
that most excellent man, not of his own times but within the memory
of man, against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain;
this arose from nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave
his soldiers more licence than is consistent with military discipline.
For this he was upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called
the corrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste
by a legate of Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him, nor was
the insolence of the legate punished, owing entirely to his easy
nature. Insomuch that someone in the Senate, wishing to excuse him,
said there were many men who knew much better how not to err than
to correct the errors of others. This disposition, if he had been
continued in the command, would have destroyed in time the fame
and glory of Scipio; but, he being under the control of the Senate,
this injurious characteristic not only concealed itself, but contributed
to his glory. (Chapter 17)
Whether it is Better To be Loved than Feared,
or the Contrary
(Recommended along with the A Bronx Tale)
A question arises: whether it be better to be loved than feared
or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to
be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person,
is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either
must be dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general
of men, that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous,
and as long as you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer
you their blood, property, life and children, as is said above,
when the need is far distant; but when it approaches they turn against
you. And that prince who, relying entirely on their promises, has
neglected other precautions, is ruined; because friendships that
are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind,
may indeed be earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need
cannot be relied upon; and men have less scruple in offending one
who is loved than one who is feared, for love is preserved by the
link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken
at every opportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves you
by a dread of punishment which never fails.
Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that,
if he does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure
very well being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always
be as long as he abstains from the property of his citizens and
subjects and from their women. But when it is necessary for him
to proceed against the life of someone, he must do it on proper
justification and for manifest cause, but above all things he must
keep his hands off the property of others, because men more quickly
forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony.
Besides, pretexts for taking away the property are never wanting;
for he who has once begun to live by robbery will always find pretexts
for seizing what belongs to others; but reasons for taking life,
on the contrary, are more difficult to find and sooner lapse. But
when a prince is with his army, and has under control a multitude
of soldiers, then it is quite necessary for him to disregard the
reputation of cruelty, for without it he would never hold his army
united or disposed to its duties....
Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the
conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing
according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish
himself on that which is in his own control and not in that of others;
he must endeavor only to avoid hatred. (Chapter 17)
On Availability
(Recommended along with A Bronx Tale)
Because, if one is on the spot, disorders are seen as they spring
up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one is not at hand,
they are heard of only when they are great, and then one can no
longer remedy them. Besides this, the country is not pillaged by
your officials; the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to
the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have more cause to love
him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He who would attack
that state from the outside must have the utmost caution; as long
as the prince resides there it can only be wrested from him with
the greatest difficulty. (Chapter 3)
Because the Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes
ought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but also
future ones, for which they must prepare with every energy, because,
when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until
they approach, the medicine is no longer in time because the malady
has become incurable; for it happens in this, as the physicians
say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the malady
it is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of
time, not having been either detected or treated in the beginning,
it becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. This it happens
in affairs of state, for when the evils that arise have been foreseen
(which it is only given to a wise man to see), they can be quickly
redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, they have
been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them, there
is no longer a remedy. (Chapter 3)
And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people
in such a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good
or evil, shall make him change; because if the necessity for this
comes in troubled times, you are too late for harsh measures; and
mild ones will not help you, for they will be considered as forced
from you, and no one will be under any obligation to you for them.
(Chapter 8)
[T]here will always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom
he can trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes
in quiet times, when citizens have need of the state, because then
every one agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far
distant they all wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when
the state has need of its citizens, then he finds but few. And so
much the more is this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only
be tried once. Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course
that his citizens will always in every sort and kind of circumstance
have need of the state and of him, and then he will always find
them faithful. (Chapter 9)
Crime Well Used
(Recommended along with Primary Colors and City Hall)
Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like,
after infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure
in his country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never
be conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others,
by means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times
to hold the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe
that this follows from cruelties being badly or well used. Those
may be called well used, if of evil it is permissable to speak well,
that are applied at one blow and are necessary to one's security,
and that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned
to the advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are those which,
notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, multiply with
time rather than decrease. Those who practice the first system are
able, by aid of God or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule,
as Agathocles did. It is impossible for those who follow the other
to maintain themselves.
Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper
ought to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary
for him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to
have to repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will
be able to reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He
who does otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always
compelled to keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on
his subjects, nor can they attach themselves to him, owing to their
continued and repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all
at one time, so that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits
ought to be given little by little, so that the flavor of them may
last longer. (Chapter 8)
On Dissembling
(Recommended along with Primary Colors and City Hall)
Everyone admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith,
and to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our
experience has been that those princes who have done great things
have held good faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent
the intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those
who have relied on their word.....It is necessary to be a fox to
discover the snares and a lion to terrify the wolves. Those who
rely simply on the lion do not understand what they are about. Therefore
a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith when such observance
may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him
to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely good this precept
would not hold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith
with you, you too are not bound to observe it with them. Nor will
there ever be wanting to a prince legitimate reasons to excuse this
nonobservance. Of this endless modern examples could be given, showing
how many treaties and engagements have been made void and of no
effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who has known
best how to employ the fox has succeeded best.
But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic,
and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple,
and so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive
will always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived.
One recent example I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander VI did
nothing else but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise,
and he always found victims; for there never was a man who had greater
power in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing,
yet would observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded
according to his wishes, because he well understood this side of
mankind.
Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities
I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them.
And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always
to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is
useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright,
and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require
not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite.
And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new
one, cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed,
being often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary
to faith, friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary
for him to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds
and variations of fortune force it, yet, as I have said above, not
to diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if compelled,
then to know how to set about it.
For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything
slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named five
qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether
merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing
more necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch
as men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, because
it belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch with
you. Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what
you are, and those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion
of the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them; and
in the actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is
not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result.
For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and
holding his state, the means will always be considered honest, and
he will be praised by everybody because the vulgar are always taken
by what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the
world there are only the vulgar, for the few find a place there
only when the many have somewhere to lean on.
One prince of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never
preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he
is most hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived
him of reputation and kingdom many a time. (Chapter 18)
Fortune in Human Affairs
(Recommended along with Primary Colors and City Hall)
It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the
opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed
by fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them
and that no one can even help them; and because of this they would
have us believe that it is not necessary to labor much in affairs,
but to let chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited
in our times because of the great changes in affairs which have
been seen, and may still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture.
Sometimes pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their
opinion. Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it
to be true that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,
but that she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps
a little less.
I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood
overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing
away the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all
yield to its violence, without being able in any way to withstand
it; and yet, though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore
that men, when the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision,
both with defenses and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again,
the waters may pass away by canal, and their force be neither so
unrestrained nor so dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows
her power where valor has not prepared to resist her, and thither
she turns her forces where she knows that barriers and defenses
have not been raised to constrain her. (Chapter 25)
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